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Abstract 
This article presents a research in developing countries with a transition economy, which presents the part of position of the 
world economy today. It contains analyses a number of indexes (such as gross product per capita, purchasing power of the 
population, etc.) and aspects of a country's economical, political and social life. It is assumed that privatization promotes 
production growth, assists in scientific and technological progress, complies with actual tendencies in social equity. 
However, privatization did not shape a real proprietor, the one who was interested in an effective long-term exploitation of 
property. 
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Here with, special aspects of a country's historical, economical, political and social development had a significant influence 
on the process and the results of economic reforms. The complex transition from a planned economy to a market one was a 
rather hard process. The objectives of privatization in this group of countries were: 
1. To perform system changes by means of new agreements for proprietary rights 
2. To ensure social equity privatization were to even the distribution of wealth in population 
3. To achieve economical efficiency, enterprises and management efficiency 
4. To pump up the budget, since the disposal of state-owned assets should allow to finance social programs, transform 
pension system and lessen fiscal deficit 
1. Method 
There are standard and non-standard privatization methods. The standard privatization methods for large state- owned 
enterprises are: direct assets sales to strategic external investors, holding of a tender to sell corporate securities, IPO of new 
stock companies. In general these methods allow implementing an effective corporate management in the companies subject 
to privatization, with major resolutions to be adopted by a single owner or tight "core" of strategic investors institutional or 
foreign ones, which have an interest in assets efficiency rising. In most of the countries with transition economy privatization 

1 Corresponding author.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of the Organizing Committee of ICOAE 2015.
252   D.Kh. Gallyamova /  Procedia Economics and Finance  24 ( 2015 )  251 – 255 
was conducted by non-standard methods, and according to principal-agent model resulted in the establishment of ineffective 
corporate management structures in the enterprises owned by insides. The three following methods of non-standard 
privatization were used more often than the others: restitution, reacquisition of shares by employees and managers and mass 
privatization.[1] The restitution means that either physical assets are returned to their former owners (Czech), or 
compensation is paid as certificates to be converted to shares (Hungary). While shares are reacquired by the employees and 
managers of state-owned enterprise being under privatization, they buy its shares or assets back and establish a new 
company later on. A number and total value of shares to be acquired by individual persons with their own or credit funds are 
limited as a rule. Furthermore, the shares proposed to the managers and employees (insiders) are undervalued (for instance, 
the discount in Poland amounted to 50%). 
 Mass privatization means non-reciprocal transfer of state assets to citizens. It assumes equal possibilities to receive a 
share of state property by all citizens; however this process does not imply that all or even major state assets will be involved. 
Assets disposal was used in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary and Poland most of all. [2] As corporate management concerns, the 
major disadvantage of non-standard privatization methods is an extensive control from insiders' part for the latter are 
discouraged to perform strategic restructuring. In virtually all of the transition economies the companies acquired by insiders 
are ineffective nowadays due to a weak corporate management structure interfering with strategic restructuring. Assets sales 
could help to avoid such problems apparently. However, it should be performed by means of a stock market; otherwise the 
transactions to change property structure out of market result in a whole range of distortions as Russian history confirms. All 
countries encountered some contradictions in privatization process. While each of them differs there are common features 
attributed to all. It was suggested that in Russia denationalization of property shall involve: the establishment of private 
sector, transformation of state sector itself and conversion of personnel and citizens into the owners of producer goods by 
means of voucher privatization. 
 According to some economists Russian resources are rather inexpensive and attractive for investors. However, on the 
opposite side they are of a high risk for projects implementation, that is Russian resources only seem to be inexpensive and 
are not such with regard to the risks involved in income generation in Russian economy. There are three variants of 
privatization: 
1. Property transfer to personnel (collectivistic or self-managing, Yugoslavia) 
2. Property distribution among population of a country (vouchers, democratic or liberal, Russia) 
3. Establishment of state holdings and cross-shareholding (Hungary) 
 In CEE privatization could be divided into three types: large, small and voucher. Large privatization involved large 
enterprises and organizations, small - small and medium ones, voucher privatization was effected by vouchers distributed for 
a small fee among population with subsequent exchange thereof for the shares of enterprises and other economy subjects. 
Until 1989, when "velvet revolutions" began in CEE countries, the economy growth rates in these countries have been 
constantly declining for 15 - 20 years, production base deteriorating and competition ability decreasing relative to Western 
countries. The absence of innovations and motivation to dedicated work were characteristic features of socialism as a 
system. There was gathering a system crisis, which required the transformation and modernization of society and economy 
to form the social system able to provide high living standards and effective production, as well as contacts with Eastern 
world. 
 The political economy of system transformation advanced the objectives not only to abolish single partied and 
undemocratic regimen, but to exchange state property for private one, centrally planned economy - for market. [3] The 
whole process of system transformation and the establishment of market economy could be divided into three stages. The 
first stage is primary restructuring, the process of gradual abolishment of orthodox socialistic economy model. In this period 
enterprises start economic accounting, i.e. self-financing, with rights delegated to the director thereof to adopt resolutions 
independently. Commerce relations are forming between enterprises, enterprises and state. The policy of state setting the 
prices cease to function, commerce banks and cooperatives are formed. The private sector expands in retail and agriculture, 
small business which was illegal formerly establishes in industry and construction. 
 The second stage is privatization, when a strata of individual proprietors forms on a legal basis as investors and actual 
owner of an enterprise and a great number of shareholders. Market infrastructure is established, that is markets of capital, 
labor, land, goods, services and intellectual products. Competition mechanism emerges, as well as mechanism of 
government economy regulation and antimonopoly policy. [4] 
 And the third stage of the further economy restructuration on the basis of privatization performed, which involves 
already not only the production of goods and services, but requires stabilization of bank system, as well as the establishment 
of new social security system and new function mechanisms for such fields as science, education and culture with business 
funds employed. Herewith, living standards of country's citizens begin rapidly improve. All three stages of system 
transformation are based on the base forming, strengthening and expanding constantly, on an active application of 
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experience of developed capitalistic countries and on foreign capital and knowledge inflow. A strong public support of 
system transformation started in CEE countries should be added hereto s well. [5] In CEE countries the total socialistic crisis 
manifested not only in the deceleration and reduction of production and its efficiency, but in low living standards relative to 
that of the neighboring West European countries in particular. In the period of primary restructuration of economy there was 
a spontaneous privatization - practical transfer of enterprises to the property of their former directors and other managers. 
State property was transformed de facto in to a private one. This process was attended with the forming of market, where 
enterprises could compete with each other on their own. 
 The process of spontaneous privatization was followed by an impulsive liberalization of prices. The prices have gotten 
free of government fix and began to correspond with the actual demand that induced inflation burst and damaged population 
living standards. Such processes were the most critical in Poland and Hungary. Thus, retail price index in Poland in 1987 
increased by 25.5%, 1988 - 59%, 1989 - in 2.6 times and in 1990 - in 5.8 times. Retail price index in Hungary increased in 
1998 by 15.5% and in 1990 - by 28.9%.[9] 
 The second period of transformation is privatization. It is privatization that became the starting point and the major 
promoter for the whole process of transformation of government planned economy into a market one, of 
administrative-and-command totalitarian society into a modern democracy. In Poland, Hungary and Yugoslavia 
privatization started in 1989, when there were enacted corresponding legislative packages and established government 
agencies in charge of its execution. In GDR privatization started in 1990, in Bulgaria and Romania - in 1991-1992.[7] 
 While at the first stage of system transformation spontaneous restructuration and privatization were conducted from the 
bottom, at the second stage these processes were regulated and promoted from the top. As early as in 1989 an extensive 
program of economy and society transformation was enacted in Poland. In the same year Hungary adopted the law of 
transformation that made privatization and incorporation legitimate. In Czechoslovakia there was conducted a renowned 
voucher privatization that assured the clarity, predictability and a rather high efficiency of the process. [8] However, the 
process of transformation was the most rapid and accurate in GDR. Eastern Germany just assumed the institutions, 
regulations and standards, which had been formed in Western Germany long ago, and began to establish capitalism based on 
the latter. 
 Meanwhile, the state maintained hold of a certain number of economy objects, infrastructure objects and natural sites. 
GDR drops its direct involvement in economy, executes deregulation policy and ensures the effectiveness of enterprises 
went private and personal sector with a relevant tax, customs, science and education policy. 
 
2. Results 
It is assumed that privatization promotes production growth, assists in scientific and technological progress, complies with 
actual tendencies in social equity. However privatization did not shape a real proprietor in Russia, the one who was 
interested in an effective long-term exploitation of property. The property of the people, the work of several generations 
were distributed among limited group of persons by a number of half-legal means, such as pyramid schemes, collateral 
auctions and fictional voucher funds. This is so called "oligarchy", "new billionaires" (there were "new paupers" as well, i.e. 
the people working full day and being not able to earn living wage) who are not going to do a business in Russia in a long 
term prospect. 
 In CEE countries the transition to market economy had its own specifics. There were no oligarchs; however their market 
was invaded by western investors who were not always interested in welfare of a country and its citizens. Some major funds 
were bought cheap and resold by parts, other enterprises were just closed or converted, i.e. the population had got dependant 
of foreign owners of national property. One of the examples of such transition was the process of privatization in former 
GDR with a direct involvement of FRG. In general, the unification of Germany was not a convergence of two economies 
(their coaptation on the basis of mutual adjustment and conjunction of particular aspects typical for each country), but GDR 
was just incorporated in FRG. 
 According to executive directors of FRG Bundesbank, the process of unification was too rushed. In particular, the 
resolution to convert salary funds at a rate of 1:1 to West German mark deprived Eastern Germany of its perhaps only 
economical advantage, low rate of wages. Besides, borders opening resulted in mass population migration that was of 
extremely negative consequences for Eastern Germany and that maintained even after nominal unification of two German 
economies at the 1st of July 1990. [15] As a rule younger and more active people were leaving the country. The egress of the 
leading scientists, engineers and technicians, as well as social employees promoted emigration attitude among the other 
people. According to the estimation of scientists in Humboldt's University by 2010 the population in Western Germany will 
decrease by 20%, that is down to 13 mln. 
 After the unification of the country low competition ability of West German's industry became apparent. The first ones of 
closed enterprises were brown coal and lignite quarries and mines (approximately one third of them, that was of the most 
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damage to environment, was eliminated), as well as the plants of brown coal caking, nuclear power plants, metallurgic and 
automotive plants, chemical enterprises of brown coal processing, dockyards, the enterprises of copper-smelting, potassium, 
food-and-flavor (including breweries and tobacco), textile, apparel and footwear industries. Very few of the industries 
managed to partially retain their positions. Even the leader of West German's economy, the electronics industry supported 
and promoted by former regimen was unable to compete in the Eastern markets successfully. After the 1st of July 1990 a 
special Board of trustees (Treuhandanstalt) was established which was committed to resolve questions of privatization of 
about 14 ths national enterprises that were the base of GDR's industry and national economy. Since the most of these 
enterprises were non-competitive the industrial objects became of an interest to West German's investors and so called 
"former owners" due to no t economic potential but cheap price, given that GDP of GDR amounted to 10% only of that in 
Western Germany, while labor efficiency made one third of West German's one. The gap in average salary per worker was 
the same. [10] Average actual income (after tax) of worker in GDR reached about a half of FRG's worker income. Therefore, 
after the buyout of eastern enterprises investors preferred to sell basic funds relatively suitable for exploitation by retail to 
the developing countries, leaving the territory of former GDR in practically de-industrialized condition. After the country 
unification unemployment reached disastrous numbers in Eastern Germany. In the whole Eastern Germany after its 
annexation to FRG 4.4 mln jobs vanished that resulted in 50% of occupied people losing their places. In eastern lands 
unemployment rate is 1.5 times higher than the average index in Germany (18 - 25%, and inclusive of hidden unemployment 
- about 30% of able-bodied population). 
 De-industrialization of Eastern Germany and ruination of its agriculture resulted in production drop by one third 
approximately according to the estimation of professor I. Kuzmin, Humboldt's University. Most of remaining enterprises in 
the former GDR were unprofitable. The new companies appearing had often turned out to be not able to compete as well. 
One of the phenomena in Germany's development after 1990 lie in the fact that geographical unification of the country did 
not resulted in automatic restoration of solidarity of German nation.[12] Moreover a split of the nation into westerners 
("wessi") and easterners ("ossi") became a factor to note in the united Germany. Substantial part of the population in both 
land of the country began forming persistent stereotypes regarding each other, and with distinct negative attributes. 
Numerous canvasses performed in Germany clearly demonstrate antipathy and antagonism persisting today. Thus, eastern 
German considers essential features of his countryman from the West to be individualism, presumption, arrogance, 
complacence and constant preoccupation with money matters. In return "wessi" are prone to attribute citizens of the former 
GDR as under-initiative and diffident people with insufficient professional qualification and weak work skills. A term 
related to GDR appeared in Germany - "Unrechtstaat", that is a state based on lawlessness, state of arbitrary rule (to the 
opposite FRG is "Rechtstaat", state of law). From this point of view all that concern GDR is divested from legitimate basis 
and should be denounced, that is everything regarding 40 years period of its existence automatically receives a negative 
connotation. Furthermore, negative relation to eastern neighbors is supported by a tax paid in western territories in favor of 
the economy of the former GDR, so called "tax of solidarity". 
 As of today Germany has to expend significant funds (about 5% of country's GDP) to finance integration of five new 
territories - modernization of autobahns, reconstruction of telecommunication system, implementation of large industrial 
projects, including the construction of largest in Europe enterprise for IC chips production in Dresden, chemical complex in 
Bitterfeld, large oil-refining complex "Leina 2000", dockyards in Rostock and Wismar. Herewith it should be noted that 
domestic product in Eastern Germany increases not due to its own production, but to investments from Western Germany. 
In the beginning of XXI century a number of countries in Eastern Europe (of the so called "socialist camp") namely 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and Czech became members of European Union, Bulgaria and Romania joined later. 
Their membership was not greeted by most of EU members for the reason that living standards in these countries was not 
higher than 30% of average in Europe. According to preliminary surveys two thirds of able-bodied Romanians are going to 
migrate to wealthy Europe for work, leaving their jobs for Ukrainians and Chinese. Due to admission of ten new countries as 
members in 2004 EU population increased up to 470 mln.[11] As of today East Europe was the first to be hit by global crisis 
for a whole number of reasons. First, real sector of these countries was most reduced, while financial systems being under 
control of western banks. Second, post-soviet mentality of the population and business, as well as direct access of western 
banks with easy money resulted in an explosive growth in consumer, mortgage and business credit. This credit avalanche 
flooding the internal market provided rapid increase of GDP index, however resulted in considerable balance of payments 
deficit reaching 25% of GDP in a number of East European countries that turns them totally dependent on growing foreign 
inflow. An excessive loan growth and light weight of the economies supported a whole number of "bubbles" forming based 
on borrowed and venture foreign capitals. 
 In Latvia gross domestic product increased from 4750.8 mln. Lat (8334.7 mln. Euros) in 2000 to 14193.5 mln. Lat 
(20296.0 mln. Euros) in 2007.[13] However 81.6% thereof was supplied by services, budget expenses and construction. 
Commerce, financial services, as well as construction and real estate demonstrated the highest growth rate. In 7 years their 
aggregated share in GDP increased from 35% to 43%. Therefore, economic boom in 2000-s was not the result of rapid 
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development in real sector, industrial production, AIC, infrastructure, minerals extraction and processing at all. European 
Union granting subsidies for structure reformations did not intend to develop new competitors, but forming instead a 
consumer infrastructure to provide the demand for European goods and services. So, the economy surge in the majority of 
East European countries originated from a rapid increase in consumption and real estate ventures exclusively. Herewith in 
Latvia the current account consisting of trade balance, current transfers (e.g. international grants or money transfers by 
migrant workers) and interest on capital was entirely negative in 2000. [14]Therefore, the country was importing goods and 
services, and served an interest on foreign capital in the amounts greatly exceeding its export and current income from 
foreign investments. The proportion between current account and GDP was growing constantly: while in 2001 current 
account deficit amounted to 394.5 mln. Lat or 7.6% of GDP, in 2006 it increased to 2376.0 mln. Lat or 21.1% of GDP. 
 
3. Conclusion 
In general, as of today the situation in Eastern Europe is comparable to that of South-East Asia just before 1997. With the 
difference that in Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines the real sector of economy was oriented to 
USA export almost entirely, while there is no such sector in Eastern Europe. Regarding the Russian economy the share of 
services in GDP structure is growing as well, so an improper conclusion might be drawn that post-industrial sector is under 
rapid development in the economy of the country. Nevertheless a more detailed analysis element-by-element demonstrates 
that in this instance the economy is rather being de-industrialized, regressing and not progressing. Real sector indices are 
decreasing, however research and development spending decreases as well. So in this case the growth of services sector has 
no relation to the establishment of information society. 
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